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of insecure attachment styles, according 
to Ein-Dor et al., is that across evolution-
ary time, the costs of insecure attachment 
styles to individuals were exceeded by ben-
efits at the group-level. These group-level 
benefits are considered a driving selective 
force, not accidental byproducts of strate-
gies that are individually advantageous – 
hence the paradox. The central idea is that 
 insecure attachment styles are suboptimal 
to the individual, yet prevalent: this “evo-
lutionary paradox” is resolved by positing 
group-level benefits. On this view, inse-
curely attached individuals are evolution-
ary altruists: they incur a fitness cost to 
enhance the fitness of other individuals 
in the group.
Here, I first question the existence of the 
“attachment paradox” and then the solu-
tion proposed by Ein-Dor et al. (2010). 
For attachment research to benefit from 
evolutionary biology, it is important that 
ideas about evolutionary processes, as well 
as assumptions about our human evolu-
tionary history, are correct and, whenever 
possible, complete. Thus, an integration of 
evolutionary and developmental science 
requires, in addition to empirical stud-
ies, conceptual analyses and discussion of 
key premises.
The hypothesis of Ein-Dor et al. (2010) 
assumes that insecure attachment styles 
are maladaptive to the individual: how-
ever, the authors do not provide sources 
to support this claim. To my knowledge, the 
fitness effects of attachment strategies have 
never been measured in humans. It would 
be most informative if studies compared 
the number of viable offspring (or a dif-
ferent proxy for fitness) of individuals with 
insecure versus other attachment styles, in 
conditions in which insecure attachment 
styles tend to develop. Ideally, such stud-
ies would be conducted cross-culturally, 
in order to ensure results generalize across 
socio-ecological conditions, or to docu-
ment and understand variation (Henrich 
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In a recent article in Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, Ein-Dor et al. (2010) 
propose that insecure attachment styles 
harm the biological fitness of individuals, yet 
may have been favored by natural selection 
because they provide benefits for the group. 
This novel hypothesis proclaims that groups 
containing a mixture of secure and insecure 
attachment styles deal more effectively with 
hazards, such as venomous snakes or fires, 
because of earlier detection and escape. 
While I support adaptationist approaches 
to development, including attachment, I 
have concerns about this specific proposal. 
In particular, I question: (1) that insecure 
attachment styles are detrimental to indi-
vidual fitness, (2) that insecure attachment 
styles are well-designed for dealing with 
danger at the group-level, (3) the under-
lying assumption that human attachment 
styles evolved in social groups comprised 
mostly of genetic relatives, (4) whether 
the empirical evidence, provided by the 
authors, can arbitrate between hypotheses 
postulating benefits to individuals versus 
benefits to groups.
Ein-Dor et al. (2010) set out to explain an 
“evolutionary paradox”: insecure attach-
ment styles appear harmful to individual 
fitness, yet they are prevalent in human 
societies. Studies show that 33–50% of all 
humans may be insecurely attached (i.e., 
anxious, avoidant), across age groups, with 
higher percentages occurring in popula-
tions living in conditions of poverty and 
instability (Cassidy and Shaver, 1999, 
2008; Mikulincer and Shaver, 2007). The 
solution to the “paradoxical” persistence 
et al., 2010). However, at present, the fitness 
costs and benefits of different attachment 
styles are unknown. Therefore, “the attach-
ment paradox” itself is a hypothesis, not a 
fact requiring explanation. Moreover, some 
theories suggest that insecure attachment 
styles can be advantageous to individuals, 
given particular conditions (e.g., Belsky 
et al., 1991; Chisholm, 1996; Nettle, 2006; 
Del Giudice, 2009; Del Giudice and Belsky, 
2010). Insecure attachment styles may be 
adaptive, for instance, if one grows up in 
a world where people generally provide 
little support (Belsky et al., 1991; Belsky 
et al., 2010). Ein-Dor et al. (2010) view 
their proposal as complementary to this 
perspective. However, the existing work 
assumes insecure attachment styles are 
advantageous to individuals, while Ein-
Dor et al. (2010) depart from the exact 
opposite assumption – the “evolutionary 
paradox” – making integration difficult. 
Still, I will argue that even if we grant that 
insecure attachment styles may harm indi-
vidual fitness, explaining their evolution in 
terms of adaptive, group-level benefits, has 
several problems.
In biology, adaptations are identified 
when a trait accommodates a presumed 
function “with sufficient precision, econ-
omy, [and] efficiency” (Williams, 1966, p. 
10). The proposal of Ein-Dor et al. (2010), 
in my view, does not meet these crite-
ria. Ein-Dor et al. argue that two major 
insecure attachment styles – avoidant 
and anxious – evolved for their group-
level benefits: “The avoidant pattern may 
be associated with quick, independent 
responses to threat, which may at times 
increase the survival chances of group 
members by solving the survival problem 
or demonstrating ways to escape it. The 
anxious pattern may be associated with 
sensitivity and quick detection of dangers 
and threats, which alert other group mem-
bers to danger and the need for protection 
or escape” (p. 129). Both these functions 
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groups, composed exclusively of insecurely 
attached individuals. Is it not the case that 
a larger number of vigilant eyes is better in 
dangerous situations?
In sum, while I support adaptation-
ist approaches to development, including 
attachment, I believe there are significant 
problems with the hypothesis advanced by 
Ein-Dor et al. (2010): that insecure attach-
ment styles may be group-selected adap-
tations for dealing with danger. Despite 
these doubts, I value the novelty of the 
hypothesis, and I look forward to future 
theoretical analyses and empirical tests of 
the current ideas.
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of the costs and benefits of altruistic 
strategies in various group compositions 
(including the ratio of relatives to non-
relatives, and their degrees of relatedness). 
Biologists have made progress exploring 
the conditions favoring the evolution of 
altruism (e.g., Nowak, 2006): yet, much 
work remains to be done, especially in the 
domain of large-scale cooperation. It is a 
merit of Ein-Dor et al. (2010) to invite 
more discussion about human ancestral 
social organizations. A better under-
standing of these contexts may provide 
insights into the evolved structure of 
developmental mechanisms, including 
their dynamic expression across the full 
breadth of conditions our species experi-
ences (Panchanathan et al., 2010).
Finally, Ein-Dor et al. (2010) present two 
kinds of evidence – cognitive and  behavioral 
– to support their hypothesis that insecure 
attachment styles evolved for benefits at 
the group-level. The cognitive evidence 
shows that anxiously attached individu-
als detect potential threats relatively fast 
and alert others about imminent danger. 
It also indicates that avoidant individuals 
initiate self-preservation efforts relatively 
fast, without relying on the help of other 
people. Both these empirical results are 
interesting; however, they do not substan-
tiate that these cognitive aspects are adap-
tations “for” the benefit of social groups. 
This is because in each example, individuals 
may themselves derive a net benefit from 
their strategy: anxious individuals because 
early detection of danger facilitates escape, 
while alerting others can induce collective 
efforts to ameliorate the threat: avoidant 
individuals because a focus on autono-
mous self-preservation may be adaptive, in 
a world where other people provide little 
social support (Belsky et al., 1991). Thus, 
the cognitive evidence cannot distinguish 
between individual-level and group-level 
benefits. The behavioral evidence provided 
by Ein-Dor et al. (2010) employs a smoke-
in-the-room experimental setting, and 
shows that: “more heterogeneous groups 
in terms of attachment orientations were 
… more effective in dealing with the dan-
gerous situation and took less time to detect 
and deal with the danger” (p. 135). However, 
it is not clear why a group-selection per-
spective would predict that heterogeneous 
groups perform better than homogeneous 
address some features of insecure attach-
ment styles, such as social withdrawal 
and high levels of stress. However, they 
do not address other features that may be 
fitness-relevant, such as: low self-esteem, 
greater risk of depression, mixed feelings 
about relationships, indiscriminate self-
disclosure, ineffective coping strategies, 
and over-dependence on others. While it 
may be possible to advance group-level 
benefits for these features as well,  Ein-Dor 
et al. do not discuss them in depth. In biol-
ogy, adaptationist accounts are considered 
most convincing when a close correspond-
ence is revealed between the structure of 
an adaptive problem and the features of 
its solution: it is not sufficient to select 
some features, and hypothesize about their 
adaptive value, while leaving out other, 
equally significant ones.
Concerning ancestral social organiza-
tion, Ein-Dor et al. (2010) assert that all 
members of a group, “in the environment 
of evolutionary adaptedness, would often 
have been genetically related” (p. 124). 
This premise, if correct, helps their pro-
posal that insecure attachment styles are 
group-level adaptations, because the costs 
incurred by altruistic individuals may be 
compensated by gains in inclusive fitness 
(Hamilton, 1964): genetic relatives are 
more likely to share copies of the same 
alleles, and so helping kin implies fur-
thering one’s own reproductive success. 
However, Ein-Dor et al. (2010) do not pro-
vide sources to support their claim that, 
historically, humans lived in groups com-
posed primarily of kin. To my knowledge, 
no such sources exist. Unfortunately, the 
precise characteristics of ancestral social 
organizations remain largely unknown. 
If anything, current evidence seems to 
suggest that humans lived in diverse pat-
terns of social organization, rather than 
a single one (Schrire, 1980; Foley, 1995; 
Irons, 1998; Marlowe, 2005; Richerson 
et al., 2009). 
Still, even if we grant that humans 
would have lived in kin-based households, 
such households may have co-existed 
in larger groups consisting of geneti-
cally non-related individuals. To what 
extent the argument of Ein-Dor et al. 
(2010) formally depends on “kin-groups 
assumption” is hard to know. Analyzing 
it requires more detailed specification 
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